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Cured: Proposing a Solution to the Hague Convention’s 




Each year, thousands of children are taken from their homes to foreign countries by one 
of their parents (the “taking parent”) without the consent of their other parent (the “left-behind 
parent”). This phenomenon is frequently referred to as international child abduction. If both the 
country from which the child was taken and the country to which the child was taken are 
signatories to the Hague Convention, the left-behind parent can file a petition for return of the 
child under the treaty. Recently, in a number of courts around the world, taking parents facing 
Hague Convention litigation have argued that, because of the risks of international travel during 
the COVID-19 pandemic, their children should not be returned. These taking parents invoke 
Article 13(b) of the Convention, which provides a defense against a child’s return if there is “a 
grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or 
otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.” Taking parents contend that if children are 
obligated to travel internationally to satisfy return orders pursuant to the Convention, the children 
will be exposed to the virus and thus face a “grave risk” under Article 13(b).  
This Comment argues that courts should adopt a rebuttable presumption against Article 
13(b) defenses predicated on the risks of an infectious disease, or “zone of disease” defenses. This 
construction of the defense does not comport with existing precedent or the goals of the Hague 
Convention, and refusing to return abducted children on these grounds could lead to serious, long-
term harm for the children. Instead, courts should only find a “grave risk” in cases where the 
child faces a particularized, demonstrable risk of serious complications incident to infection. This 
Comment encourages courts to fashion responsible and pragmatic protective measures to attach to 
Hague Convention return orders, ensuring both the safety and the prompt return of children who 
have been abducted. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In February 2020, the same month that the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) 
first appeared in Europe,1 an eleven-year-old girl, PT, arrived in England with her 
mother.2 PT, a “polite, calm, and confident girl,” was likely surprised to find 
herself in England.3 She had lived in Spain her entire young life, and her mother 
had not told her that they were traveling to England.4 Actually, PT’s mother had 
told her that they were moving to another town in Spain.5 Instead, the mother and 
daughter arrived in England and immediately moved in with the mother’s new 
partner in the southeastern region of the country.6 PT later reported that she was 
“a bit scared” of her mother’s new partner and that he shouted at her.7  
Back in Spain, PT’s father, who shared parental responsibility of PT with 
PT’s mother under a judgement issued by the Spanish courts, alleged the child’s 
move to England took place without his knowledge or consent.8 Initially, PT was 
told to lie to her father about their whereabouts.9 When PT’s father did eventually 
learn that PT was living in England with her mother, he demanded that the child 
be returned to Spain.10 PT’s mother refused, so the father traveled to England, 
hoping to retrieve PT.11 The mother met the father at a shopping mall in England 
and allowed him to see PT, but she again refused to permit him to take the child 
back to Spain.12 
Because the mother had unilaterally moved PT from Spain to England in 
breach of the father’s custody rights and without his consent or knowledge, the 
father had a strong case for international child abduction. On March 10, 2020, 
PT’s father filed a petition in the English courts for the child’s return to Spain13 
under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
 
1  Gianfranco Spiteri et al., First Cases of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-10) in the WHO European 
Region, 25(9) EUROSURVEILLANCE (2020), https://perma.cc/GK3K-XKQU. Please be advised that 
the COVID-19 pandemic is still ongoing at the time of writing and publication. Any 
characterizations and discussions of COVID-19 in this Comment reflect only the understanding 
and research of the author and should not be relied on for any medical or scientific purposes. 
2  KR v. HH [2020] EWHC (Fam) 834, [3] (Eng.). 
 3  Id. at [31]. 
4  Id. at [36], [31]. 
5  Id. at [31]. 
6  Id. at [6]. 
7  Id. at [32]. 
8  Id. at [37]–[38]. 
9  Id. at [38]. 
10  Id. at [7]. 
11  Id. 
12  Id. 
13  Id. at [8]. 
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Abduction (the Hague Convention or the Convention).14 The Hague Convention 
provides a shared civil remedy among States Party—a return of child order—for 
left-behind parents in international child abduction cases.15 The return of child 
remedy is available to left-behind parents who can establish a prima facie case 
under the Convention. Left-behind parents establish a prima facie case by 
demonstrating that their child was wrongfully removed or retained outside the 
child’s habitual residence and in violation of custody rights that the left-behind 
parent was actively exercising.16 If the court finds that the left-behind parent has 
established a prima facie case, it must then determine whether any affirmative 
defenses apply that would permit the abductor to keep the child in the country 
that the child was abducted to.  
After PT’s father filed a return of child petition in the English courts, a 
Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service (CAFCASS) officer 
interviewed PT.17 The social worker told England’s High Court, Family Division 
in London, that PT was “very angry with her mother for taking her to England 
against her wishes” and that the child’s emotional state was one of “desperation” 
at having been removed from Spain.18 The judge noted that the social worker, 
“who is an extremely experienced CAFCASS Officer,” told him that that “this 
was only the second time in her long experience that she had encountered a child 
expressing such strong views in favour of return, despite remaining throughout in 
the care of their primary carer.”19  
The High Court judge found that PT’s father had established a prima facie 
case for return and that PT had, in fact, been abducted from Spain by her 
mother.20 In response, PT’s mother argued that the COVID-19 pandemic posed 
a “grave risk of harm” to PT and that, because traveling to Spain would put the 
child at risk of infection, PT should remain in England with her.21 Thus, the judge 
was asked to consider one of the Hague Convention’s limited affirmative 
defenses. Under Article 13(b) of the Convention, a court is not bound to return a 
child if “there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to 
physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable 
situation.”22 A grave risk exists, inter alia, where the return of the child would put 
 
14  Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. 
No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter The Hague Convention]. 
15  See id. 
16  Id. art. 3. 
17  KR v. HH [2020] EWHC (Fam) 834, [10] (Eng.). 
18  Id. at [34]. 
19  Id. at [33]. 
20  Id. at [39]. 
21  Id. at [46]–[47]. 
22  The Hague Convention, supra note 14, art. 13.  
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him or her “in imminent danger prior to the resolution of the custody dispute—
e.g., returning the child to a zone of war, famine, or disease.”23 In this case, PT’s 
mother argued that the child faced a heightened risk of infection by traveling 
during a pandemic and returning to Spain, where COVID-19 infections were high. 
In essence, the mother raised a “zone of disease” defense.  
The High Court examined the mother’s “zone of disease” defense in two 
parts. First, the judge considered that, on the date the judgment was prepared, 
March 29, 2020, the pandemic was more advanced in Spain than in the England—
the official death toll stood at 6,528 in Spain and 1,228 in England.24 However, 
the judge also noted that the COVID-19 pandemic was a “serious public health 
emergency” in both countries and predicted that infection numbers would 
continue to rise in England and in Spain in the coming weeks.25 Thus, he observed, 
“there is a genuine risk that PT could contract the virus whether she remains in 
England or returns to Spain.”26 The High Court also noted that “those who are 
considered most at risk of serious complications from coronavirus are the elderly 
and those with underlying health conditions. Neither PT, nor her parents, fall 
within this category.”27  
Second, the judge considered the increased risk of infection that PT would 
face by traveling internationally to return to her father in Spain. “I accept that 
international travel at this time potentially carries with it a higher prospect of 
infection than remaining in self-isolation,” wrote the judge.28 “[T]he risk of 
infection posed by air travel, whilst no doubt significantly greater than normal, is 
not so high that either government [ ] felt [it] necessary to end flights altogether.”29 
Ultimately, the judge concluded that while flying from England to Spain during 
the pandemic would increase the child’s risk of contracting the virus, “such a risk, 
when considered in the context of the likely harm that would be suffered by PT 
should she contract the virus, [ ] sufficient to amount to the ‘grave risk’ of physical 
harm required by Art[icle] 13(b).”30  
In light of this finding, the High Court ordered PT’s immediate return. The 
High Court noted that, because there was no guarantee that flights would continue 
to operate between England and Spain much longer, any delay in travel could 
 
23  Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1069 (6th Cir. 1996) (emphasis omitted).  
24  KR v. HH [2020] EWHC (Fam) 834, [46] (Eng.) 
25  Id. at [47].  
26  Id. 
27  Id.  
28  Id. 
29  Id. 
30  Id. 
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make the child’s return to Spain “practically impossible” and leave her stranded in 
England with her abductor until the resolution of the pandemic.31  
PT’s case was among the first of its kind. It illustrates the challenges a court 
faces when navigating the uncharted territory of the “zone of disease” defense. 
From the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic until January 2021, at least eight 
Hague Convention cases explicitly addressed the risks of infection in the context 
of the grave risk of harm defense.32 Although the COVID-19 pandemic is an 
unprecedented public health crisis, it is not the last time judicial and administrative 
authorities will be asked to adjudicate Hague Convention cases against the 
backdrop of an infectious disease outbreak. The impact of COVID-19 on 
international child abduction litigation has exposed serious gaps in Article 13(b) 
caselaw and guidelines. To this author’s knowledge, no legal scholarship has 
directly examined the “zone of disease” formulation of the grave risk of harm 
defense, even though it bears a resemblance to other well-established forms of the 
defense, like the zone of war formulation. Now that courts are beginning to 
observe defendants in Hague Convention cases harness the global pandemic for 
their benefit, it is crucial to develop a robust and operable framework for 
evaluating Article 13(b) defenses predicated on the risks of an infectious disease. 
This Comment is the first step in helping fill that void.  
First and foremost, this Comment relies on the text of the Convention and 
on its accompanying explanatory report, which is instructive regarding the 
intentions of the Convention drafters. To flesh out provisions of the Convention, 
this Comment will often rely on interpretations put forward by U.S. courts, which 
provide a robust and coherent body of caselaw. This Comment will also discuss a 
number of foreign judgments that interpret the Convention, including several 
recent cases dealing with the “zone of disease” defense in the COVID-19 context. 
Sections II and III discuss the Hague Convention’s purpose, its exceptions, 
and the prima facie case for return under the Convention. The Convention rests 
upon a conviction that the best way to combat international child abduction is to 
refuse to grant it legal recognition. Thus, the treaty is designed to restore the legal 
status quo between the parties by returning the child to his or her habitual 
residence. Section IV explores alternatives to the immediate return of an abducted 
child and discusses the potential long-term consequences for a child if a “zone of 
 
31  Id. at [50].  
32  See, e.g., id.; FamC (MC TA) 52595-02-20 The Father v. The Mother (2020) (Isr.), 
https://perma.cc/E8NN-HEZS; C v. G [2020] IECA 233 (Ir.); Re N (a child) [2020] EWFC 35 
(Eng.); Chambers v. Russell, No. 1:20CV498, 2020 WL 5044036, at *14 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 26, 2020); 
Thüringer Oberlandesgericht [OLGZ] [Higher Regional Court of Thuringia] Mar. 17, 2020, 1 UF 
11/20 (Ger.); Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhue [OLGZ] [Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe] June 
25, 2020, 2 UF 200/19 (Ger.) https://perma.cc/ZU2P-Z5KG; Amtsgericht Hamm 
Familiengericht Beschluss [Hamm Local Court], Apr. 23, 2020, 32 F 14/20, (Ger.) 
https://perma.cc/9EQ6-5SS9.  
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disease” defense is successful. Section V explains COVID-19’s impact on Hague 
Convention cases. Section VI analogizes the risks of infectious diseases to existing 
categories of risk found in Article 13(b) caselaw in order to evaluate the viability 
of “zone of disease” defenses under current precedent. Section VII proposes a 
framework for evaluating grave risk of harm defenses predicated on the risks of 
an infectious disease.  
This Comment’s proposal upholds the goals of the Hague Convention in 
restoring the legal status quo between parties and disincentivizing forum shopping 
by securing the prompt and safe return of the child. Ultimately, this Comment 
concludes that, absent a showing of particularized risk to the child, courts should 
reject grave risk of harm defenses where the underlying risk alleged is exposure to 
an infectious disease. Judicial and administrative authorities charged with 
adjudicating the Hague Convention are empowered to exercise judicial discretion 
and to fashion protective measures, often referred to as undertakings, to ensure 
that a child’s return is safe. This Comment recommends that in lieu of granting 
grave risk of harm exceptions—which would flatly deny left-behind parents’ 
petitions for return—courts should exercise their powers to deliver common-
sense solutions to the logistical and safety obstacles posed by infectious diseases.  
II. THE RETURN OF CHILD PETITION 
Each year, thousands of children are taken from their homes to foreign 
countries by one of their parents (the “taking parent”) without the consent of their 
other parent (the “left-behind parent”).33 This phenomenon is frequently referred 
to as international child abduction. If both the country that the child was taken 
from (the child’s “habitual residence”) and the country the child was taken to (“the 
State of refuge”) are signatories to the Hague Convention, the left-behind parent 
can file a petition for return of the child under the treaty.34 As long as the child is 
under sixteen years old, the Convention allows the left-behind parent to civilly 
enforce the child’s return from one State Party to another.35 A decision under the 
Convention does not purport to resolve the underlying custody issues on their 
merits; a return of child order simply seeks to restore the parties’ legal and 
geographical status quos.36 
To enforce the child’s return, the left-behind parent must establish a prima 
facie case for return of the child. A successful prima facie case under the 
Convention creates a presumption that the child should be returned and 
 
33  For a statistical analysis of applications made in 2015 under the Hague Convention, see HAGUE 
CONF. ON PRIV. INT’L L., GLOB. REP. 3 (2018), https://perma.cc/HA27-L9DV.  
34  The Hague Convention, supra note 14, art. 13. 
35  Id. art. 4.  
36  Id. art. 19. 
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establishes that the taking parent is, in fact, an abductor. Then, the abductor has 
the opportunity to raise one or more defenses opposing return. The United States 
and over 100 other countries37 have ratified the Hague Convention, which is “the 
most important international treaty on the subject of international child abduction 
and probably in all of international family law.”38 This Section examines the 
purpose of the Hague Convention, the factual circumstances of international child 
abduction, the procedural obligations of States Party, and the prima facie case for 
return of a child under the Convention. 
A. The Purpose of the Hague Convention: Restoring the Status Quo  
The Convention provides a civil remedy—a return of child order—to left-
behind parents who demonstrate that their custody rights may have been violated 
by their child’s “wrongful[ ] remov[al] or ret[ention]” outside the child’s country 
of “habitual residence.”39 The left-behind parent, with the assistance of his or her 
government’s foreign service department, brings suit against the taking parent in 
the State of refuge. If the left-behind parent is successful in obtaining a return of 
child order, this order does not necessitate the left-behind parent will gain custody; 
it only assures that the child will be returned to his or her country of habitual 
residence.40  
The Convention serves a crucial procedural and administrative role in 
combating international child abduction and includes important “safety valves” 
like Article 13(b) to protect the wellbeing and wishes of the child. However, the 
goal of the Hague Convention is easily misunderstood given “the drama implicit 
in the fact that it is concerned with the protection of children in international 
relations.”41 Accordingly, it may surprise some to learn that cases litigated under 
the Convention do not decide the merits of the underlying custody dispute.42 
“[T]he Convention’s stated object . . . is to secure the prompt return of children 
who have been wrongfully removed or retained.”43 By securing the prompt return 
of the child but declining to reach the underlying custody dispute, the Convention 
 
37  Ratifying nations include: the U.S., Brazil, Hong Kong and Macau, Australia, Canada, Iraq, Japan, 
France, Italy, South Korea, Mexico, the U.K., South Africa, Morocco, Russia, and Thailand. 
Notable exclusions include: China, India, the Philippines, Iran, and Vietnam. Status Table: 28: 
Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIV. 
INT’L L., https://perma.cc/3E7T-N6EQ.  
38  JEREMY D. MORLEY, INTERNATIONAL FAMILY LAW PRACTICE § 9:1 (updated July 2020). 
39  The Hague Convention, supra note 14, arts. 1, 3.  
40  Id. art. 19. 
41  Rinau v. Lithuania, App. No. 10926/09, ¶ 15 (Dec. 3, 2019), https://perma.cc/92MX-UHR9. 
42  The Hague Convention, supra note 14, at art. 19. 
43  Elisa Pérez-Vera, Explanatory Report: Hague Convention on Private International Law, in ACTS AND 
DOCUMENTS OF THE FOURTEENTH SESSION 426, 431 (1982) https://perma.cc/T5X5-U2VL 
[hereinafter The Pérez-Vera Report]. 
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combats and deters the practice of international child abduction by neutralizing 
the potential benefits of forum shopping.44  
International child abduction creates unfair legal and logistical advantages for 
the abductor. It is these artificially-created advantages that often lead parents to 
abduct their children internationally in the first place.45 First, abductors use 
international child abduction to impermissibly forum shop for favorable custody 
laws in other countries.46 A parent may abduct a child to a country with more 
favorable custody laws intending to exploit those laws to the left-behind parent’s 
disadvantage. 47 Alternatively, the taking parent may seek an opportunity to 
relitigate—or simply escape—a custody judgment that was decided unfavorably 
against them in the child’s habitual residence.48 Even if the custody consequences 
of abduction are secondary in the taking parent’s mind to his or her primary 
motivation for removing the child, the taking parent will still stand to benefit from 
“the consolidation through lapse of time of the situation brought about by the 
removal of the child.”49 Second, by abducting a child internationally, the taking 
parent erects a sizeable logistical and financial hurdle for the left-behind parent 
who must pursue cross-border litigation to retrieve his or her abducted child.50  
Recognizing the unfair legal and logistical advantages international child 
abduction confers on taking parents, the Hague Convention’s official explanatory 
report, the Pérez-Vera Report, firmly states that “the Convention as a whole rests 
upon . . . the conviction that the best way to combat [illegal child removals] at an 
international level is to refuse to grant them legal recognition.”51 Because the Convention 
drafters saw forum shopping as a loophole that incentivized and enabled 
international child abduction, they placed considerable weight on the “restoration 
of the status quo” via the “prompt return” of the abducted child.52 Once the child 
is returned to his or her habitual residence, the parents are to litigate any 
outstanding custody disputes according the laws of that country, which is “in 
principle best placed to decide upon questions of custody and access.” 53 
 
 
44  Id. at 429.  
45  Id.   
46  Id. 
47  See generally id. 
48  See generally id. 
49  Id. at 429. 
50  Id. 
51  Id. at 434 (emphasis added). 
52  Id. (quoting The Hague Convention, supra note 14, art. 1). 
53  The Hague Convention, supra note 14, art. 19; the Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 43, at 434–435. 
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B. Factual Circumstances of Abduction  
The circumstances of international child abduction vary considerably. 
Sometimes, the taking parent ostensibly takes the child on vacation but never 
returns. In a prototypical case handled by the State Department in 2004, a 
mother took her child to Rio de Janeiro for a vacation; the father planned to join 
them there later.54 Three days after arriving in Rio, the mother initiated divorce 
proceedings in Brazil and demanded that the father travel to Brazil to sign papers 
ceding full custody of their child to her.55  
In other cases, the taking parent disappears with the child unexpectedly, 
and the left-behind parent has no indication of where they have gone—or if the 
child has even left the country. A recent case heard in the U.K.’s Family Division 
of the High Court is illustrative of this type of “ghosting.” In AX v. CY,56 the 
father and mother, who both lived in Spain, had what appeared to be an amiable 
custody agreement, which had been incorporated into a written document in 
March 2018 with the assistance of lawyers.57 There was no indication to the 
father that there were any issues with the agreement, so “it came as a 
considerable surprise to him, and no doubt great dismay as well,” to learn that 
neither the mother nor the child were living in their home in Barcelona and that 
the child was no longer attending her school.58 In December 2018, the mother 
sent the father a picture of the child in London, and the father learned the 
potential whereabouts of his daughter for the first time.59 The father provided 
the court with telephone transcripts in which the mother told him that there was 
nothing he could do:  
Do you think you’re going to win by searching the whole world or what[?] . . . 
[A]nd when you come to look for your daughter, wherever you think she is, 
look, come with a lot of money in your pocket . . .[Y]ou won’t have anywhere 
to look to find me . . .. Nobody knows where I live.60 
Sometimes, taking parents flee with children after an unfavorable custody 
decision is handed down by the child’s habitual residence.61 Unlike “ghosting,” 
which intentionally catches the left-behind parent off guard, this type of abduction 
may be responsive to preventative measures advocated for by the Permanent 
 
54  U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL 
ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ABDUCTION 26 (2010), https://perma.cc/7XV8-MV5Y [hereinafter 
STATE DEP’T, REPORT ON COMPLIANCE]. 
55  Id.  
56  [2020] EWHC (Fam) 1599 (UK). 
57  Id. at [7]–[8]. 
58  Id. at [8].  
59  Id. at [10]. 
60  Id.  
61  See STATE DEP’T, REPORT ON COMPLIANCE, supra note 54, at 30. 
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Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH).62 
Preventative measures are proactive steps taken by the government to intervene 
in a hostile custody situation before an abduction takes place.63 
In contrast, some taking parents may be fleeing an abusive relationship. The 
issue of domestic violence generally, and specifically instances where victims of 
domestic violence employ international child abduction to escape the abuse of 
themselves and their families, has recently become more visible in the public 
consciousness.64 One particularly harrowing case, Van De Sande v. Van De Sande,65 
describes escalating physical and verbal abuse directed by the father, Davy, at the 
mother, Jennifer, and their children.66 Jennifer and the children finally escaped 
their abuser in 2004, during a visit to Jennifer’s parents in the U.S., when Jennifer 
told Davy that she and the children would not return to Belgium.67 Davy 
“threatened to kill the children. He had earlier threatened to kill Jennifer. And the 
next day, in a conversation with Jennifer's brother, he threatened to kill 
‘everybody.’”68 Eventually, Jennifer informed her father about Davy's threats.69 
Jennifer’s father called law enforcement and a police officer escorted Davy from 
the house.70 Later, the court found that Davy’s abuse amounted to a grave risk of 
harm under Article 13(b) and accordingly denied his petition for return of the 
children to Belgium.71 There are a number of legal scholars whose work sheds 
light on this intersection between domestic violence and international child 
abduction.72 As Van De Sande illustrates, Article 13(b) acts as an important 
safeguard in this context.   
 
62  See generally HAGUE CONF. ON PRIV. INT’L L., Part III—Preventative Measures, in GUIDE TO GOOD 
PRACTICE UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 25 OCTOBER 1980 ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF 
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION (2005) https://perma.cc/3M9E-GKNQ. 
63  See generally id.  
64  See, e.g., Brian Quillen, The New Face of International Child Abduction: Domestic-Violence Victims and Their 
Treatment Under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 49 TEX. INT’L 
L.J. 621 (2014). 
65  431 F.3d 567 (7th Cir. 2005). 
66  Id. at 529, 569–70. 
67  Id. at 569. 
68  Id.  
69  Id. at 570. 
70  Id.  
71  Id. at 572. 
72  See, e.g., Kyle Simpson, What Constitutes A “Grave Risk of Harm?”: Lowering the Hague Child Abduction 
Convention’s Article 13(b) Evidentiary Burden to Protect Domestic Violence Victims, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
841, 846 (2017); Shani M. King, The Hague Convention and Domestic Violence: Proposals for Balancing the 
Policies of Discouraging Child Abduction and Protecting Children from Domestic Violence, 47 FAM. L.Q. 299, 
300 (2013); Karen Brown Williams, Fleeing Domestic Violence: A Proposal to Change the Inadequacies of the 
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction in Domestic Violence Cases, 4 J. 
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C. Procedural Matters & Central Authorities  
While the circumstances of the abduction—and the culpability of the 
parties—are case-specific, the procedural path for filing a Hague Convention case 
is standardized across States Party.73 Under Article 6 of the Convention, each 
country that has ratified or acceded to the Convention is required to have a Central 
Authority (in the U.S., the State Department), which is the main point of contact 
for parents and other governments involved in abduction cases.74 Once the left-
behind parent realizes that the child is missing, he or she will inform the Central 
Authority in his or her country that an abduction has occurred. The Central 
Authority works with the left-behind parent to complete an application, required 
under Article 8 of the Convention, in order to initiate the process.75 Then, the 
Central Authority forwards the competed application to the corresponding 
Central Authority in the State of refuge and monitors the case throughout the 
foreign administrative and legal processes.76 Documents submitted as part of a 
Hague Convention application to the Central Authority are “admissible in courts 
in partner countries without the formalities often required by courts for admitting 
documents from foreign countries.”77 
Cooperation between Central Authorities is a cornerstone of the Convention 
and absolutely essential to the Convention’s efficacy in addressing the scourge of 
international child abductions. Article 7 of the Convention requires Central 
Authorities “to secure the prompt return of children” “either directly or through 
an intermediary” and to “take all appropriate measures”: 
a) to discover the whereabouts of a child who has been wrongfully removed 
or retained;  
b) to prevent further harm to the child or prejudice to interested parties by 
taking or causing to be taken provisional measures;  
c) to secure the voluntary return of the child or to bring about an amicable 
resolution of the issues;  
 
MARSHALL L. J. 39, 41–42 (2011); Noah L. Browne, Relevance and Fairness: Protecting the Rights of 
Domestic-Violence Victims and Left-Behind Fathers Under the Hague Convention on International Child 
Abduction, 60 DUKE L.J. 1193, 1194 (2011); see also Quillen, supra note 64, at 622; Julia Alanen, When 
Human Rights Conflict: Mediating International Parental Kidnapping Disputes Involving the Domestic Violence 
Defense, 40 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 49, 51 (2008) 
73  NAT’L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILD., LITIGATING INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 
CASES UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION 3 (2012) https://perma.cc/PND3-AFQQ [hereinafter 
NCMEC, HAGUE CONVENTION MANUAL]. 
74  The Hague Convention, supra note 14, art. 6. 
75  Id. arts. 6, 8.  
76  Id. art. 9. 
77  Important Features of the Hague Abduction Convention—Why the Hague Convention Matters, BUREAU OF 
CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://perma.cc/7ZHB-2UU7. 
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d) to exchange, where desirable, information relating to the social background 
of the child;  
e) to provide information of a general character as to the law of their State in 
connection with the application of the Convention;  
f) to initiate or facilitate the institution of judicial or administrative 
proceedings with a view to obtaining the return of the child and, in a proper 
case, to make arrangements for organising or securing the effective exercise 
of rights of access;  
g) where the circumstances so require, to provide or facilitate the provision 
of legal aid and advice, including the participation of legal counsel and 
advisers;  
h) to provide such administrative arrangements as may be necessary and 
appropriate to secure the safe return of the child;  
i) to keep each other informed with respect to the operation of this 
Convention and, as far as possible, to eliminate any obstacles to its 
application.78  
As discussed later in Sections V, VI, and VII, in the infectious disease context, the 
Central Authorities’ duty to secure the “prompt return of children” may be in 
tension with their obligation to do so “[safe]ly.”79  
If the child is abducted to the U.S., for example, the State Department (the 
U.S.’s Central Authority) will begin the process of locating the child after receiving 
from the Central Authority of the child’s habitual residence a completed 
application filed by the left-behind parent.80 The State Department partners with 
other governmental and non-governmental agencies, including the International 
Social Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the International Criminal 
Police Organization (INTERPOL), individual states’ missing-child 
clearinghouses, and the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children 
(NCMEC), to locate the child “using school, employment, financial, social 
security, police, postal, internet or other public records.”81 The investigative 
process may be particularly arduous if the taking parent has transitory living 
accommodations, difficulty enrolling the child in school, illegal immigration 
status, or a fear of detection by law enforcement.82  
Once the child is located, the U.S. State Department will try to negotiate 
with the taking parent to voluntarily return the child.83 If those efforts are 
unsuccessful, the State Department will attempt to secure an affordable or pro bono 
attorney for the left-behind parent by sending outreach letters to attorneys who 
 
78  The Hague Convention, supra note 14, art. 7.  
79  Id. 
80  NCMEC, HAGUE CONVENTION MANUAL, supra note 73, at 3. 
81  Id. at 92.  
82  Id.  
83  Id. at 93. 
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have agreed to consider representation.84 Once the left-behind parent has retained 
an attorney, that attorney will aid the left-behind parent in filing a Hague petition 
for the return of the child in the appropriate court. Impediments to smooth 
litigation may include language barriers to effective attorney-client communication 
and financial barriers that prevent the left-behind parent from traveling to the 
State of refuge for hearings.85  
Not all U.S. courts are equally prepared to handle Hague Convention cases, 
which are “unusual” under the most straightforward circumstances.86 To alleviate 
confusion, the State Department will send a letter to the judge presiding over the 
case that “explains the State Department’s role as U.S. Central Authority for the 
Hague Convention and refers to key provisions of the Hague Petition and 
documents regarding the history of the Hague Convention (i.e., the Pérez-Vera 
Report).”87 The State Department will also provide the judge with a list of other 
judges in the same (or nearby) jurisdiction(s) who may be able to provide their 
own experience as a guide.88  
The State Department’s Hague Convention procedures are an example of 
how one Central Authority—albeit one in a demonstrably compliant State 
Party89—has decided to fulfill its requirements under Article 7. But this illustration 
also demonstrates how, even in compliant countries and under the best of 
circumstances, international child abduction cases are far from smooth sailing for 
the left-behind parent. In countries that have a demonstrated pattern of 
noncompliance with the Convention, judicial authorities fail to implement and 
comply with the provisions of the Convention and authorities fail to take 
appropriate steps to locate children or enforce return orders, leaving petitions 
unresolved—sometimes for years.90 Thus, although the Hague Convention, and 
the cross-border cooperation the Convention mandates, has undoubtedly eased 
the otherwise-unmanageable burden on left-behind parents attempting to retrieve 
their abducted children, these cases remain extremely burdensome for the left-
behind parent. This holds true even in complaint countries—but especially in 
those countries exhibiting a pattern of noncompliance.  
 
84  Id. 
85  Id. at 94–95.  
86  Id. at 98. 
87  Id. at 99. 
88  Id. 
89  U.S. STATE DEP’T, REPORT ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL 
ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 8 (2020) https://perma.cc/3W7C-HV5C. 
90  Each year the U.S. State Department issues an annual report on compliance with the Hague 
Convention. In 2020, Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Jordan, Peru, Romania 
and the U.A.E. where all flagged as States Party demonstrating a pattern of noncompliance. Id. 
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D. Prima Facie Case and Defenses 
Article 3 of the Hague Convention provides that:  
The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where –  
a) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or 
any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the 
child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and  
b) at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, 
either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal 
or retention.91  
It is typical for courts in the U.S. and in other States Party to condense and 
reframe these Article 3 elements into a threshold determination of habitual 
residence, followed by a two-step inquiry to determine whether the removal or 
retention was “wrongful.”92 Consider the U.S. Supreme Court’s articulation of the 
prima facie case for wrongful removal under the Convention: the left-behind 
parent must establish by a preponderance of the evidence93 that (1) the child was 
habitually resident in a foreign country immediately before his or her removal to 
or retention in the U.S., (2) the removal or retention is in breach of the petitioner’s 
custody rights under the law of the foreign country, and (3) the petitioner was 
exercising his or her custody rights at the time of removal or retention.94  
There are five potential defenses95 to a prima facie case of wrongful removal 
or retention, which, according to the Pérez-Vera Report, must be strictly 
construed—“applied only as far as they go and no further”—to prevent the 
Convention from becoming a “dead letter.”96 These defenses include: the “age 
and maturity” exception (Article 13), the consent exception (Article 13(a)), the 
“now-settled” exception (Article 12), the human rights exception (Article 20), and 
the “grave risk of harm” exception (Article 13(b)).97 The most common of these 




91  The Hague Convention, supra note 14, art. 3. 
92  The Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 43, at 444.  
93  International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(1) (implementing the Hague 
Convention in the U.S.). 
94  See, e.g., Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 168 (2013). 
95  MELISSA L. BREGER ET AL., New York Law of Domestic Violence § 4.6 (3d ed. 2020). 
96  The Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 43, at 434.  
97  The Hague Convention, supra note 14, arts. 12, 13 & 20. 
98  Sharon C. Nelson, Turning Our Backs on the Children: Implications of Recent Decisions Regarding the Hague 
Convention on International Child Abduction, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 669, 676 (2001). 
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III. ARTICLE 13(B): THE FRIEDRICH FRAMEWORK 
Article 13(b) of the Hague Convention states that  
the judicial or administrative authority of the requested State is not bound to 
order the return of the child if the person, institution or other body which 
opposes its return establishes that . . .there is a grave risk that his or her return 
would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place 
the child in an intolerable situation.99  
Friedrich v. Friedrich is the preeminent case on the Article 13(b) grave risk defense. 
Not only does it define the grave risk exception for U.S. courts, it is also frequently 
cited in Hague Convention decisions abroad.100 In Friedrich, the Sixth Circuit held 
that an Article 13(b) grave risk exists in two circumstances. The first is where 
“there is a grave risk of harm when return of the child puts the child in imminent 
danger prior to the resolution of the custody dispute—e.g., returning the child to 
a zone of war, famine, or disease.”101 The second is “in cases of serious abuse or 
neglect, or extraordinary emotional dependence, when the court in the country of 
habitual residence, for whatever reason, may be incapable or unwilling to give the 
child adequate protection.”102 As previously noted, in conducting an Article 13(b) 
analysis, “courts cannot consider information that would be proper in a plenary 
custody hearing, engage in a custody determination, or address who would be the 
better parent” because judges adjudicating Hague Convention cases are not 
authorized to pass judgment on the underlying custody dispute.103  
Historically, American courts have construed the Article 13(b) defense 
narrowly, rarely finding a grave risk of harm to the child. This approach aligns 
with the drafters’ intention that all of the Convention’s defenses “be interpreted 
in a restrictive fashion.”104 Applying the Friedrich framework, “U.S. courts have 
held that the defense is not satisfied in cases [where, upon return, the child will 
face] poverty, unfavorable living conditions, or limited educational 
opportunities.”105 Additionally, pursuant to the Convention’s objective of 
deterring forum shopping by abductors, U.S. courts have found arguments 
predicated on psychological harm created by the child’s future separation from 
their abductor unconvincing, holding that “[t]he harm to the child must be greater 
 
99  The Hague Convention, supra note 14, art. 13.  
100  See, e.g., C v. G [2020] IECA 223 (Ir.).   
101  Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1069 (6th Cir. 1996) (emphasis omitted). 
102  Id.  
103  Lauren Cleary, Disaggregating the Two Prongs of Article 13(b) of the Hague Convention to Cover Unsafe and 
Unstable Situations, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 2619, 2632 (2020).  
104  The Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 43, at 434. 
105  Cleary, supra note 103, at 2633.  
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than what is normally to be expected when a child is taken away from one parent 
and passed to another parent.”106  
Foreign courts differ from those in the U.S. and each other in their treatment 
of the grave risk of harm exception in many of the exception’s applications. For 
example, the treatment of grave risk of harm defenses concerning allegations of 
domestic violence tends to vary considerably between courts.107 In contrast, the 
treatment of Article 13(b) exceptions predicated on “the unsuitability of 
conditions in the child’s habitual residence writ large” is relatively uniform 
internationally.108 That is because Friedrich is “well-known” throughout the global 
judiciary, and many courts employ it as a guide when adjudicating this type of 
defense, leading to more consistent results.109 In most countries, however, there is 
a dearth of cases dealing with a grave risk of harm defense predicated on 
conditions in the child’s habitual residence. In the courts that have seen this 
construction of the exception raised, it has been “raised most frequently with 
regard to Israel.”110 The vast majority of courts concluded that the war-zone 
conditions in Israel did not constitute a grave risk of harm to the child.111 An 
Argentinian court of first instance reasoned that “[u]nfortunately, acts of terrorism 
due to political, racial and religious intolerance occur all over the world. As the 
Prosecutor for Minors points out in his judgment . . . in the city of Buenos Aires, 
where [the child currently lives], terrorist acts were perpetrated . . . which . . . 
caused outrage around the world.”112 The court’s judgment rests on the distinction 
between a particularized risk and a general, or universal, one.  
Because Article 13(b) is so often litigated and so often fraught with 
confusion relative to the Convention’s other defenses, it is the only Convention 
defense about which the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law (HCCH) has seen necessary to publish a guide. The HCCH’s 
Guide to Good Practice (the Guide) provides guidance on the operation of Article 
13(b) defenses under the Hague Convention to all States Party.113 The Guide to 
 
106  Id. at 2634.  
107  Peter McEleavy, Case Law Analysis: Risks Associated with the Child’s State of Habitual Residence, HAGUE 
CONF. ON PRIV. INT’L L.: INT’L CHILD ABDUCTION DATABASE (INCADAT) (April 2013) 
https://perma.cc/9JRU-E68Y [hereinafter McEleavy, Habitual Residence Case Law Analysis]. 
108  Id. 
109  Id. 
110  Id. 
111  Id. 
112  Buenos Aires Court of First Instance, 05/10/2001, “A v. A.” (2001) (Arg), 
https://perma.cc/GAY7-3EMF.  
113  HAGUE CONF. ON PRIV. INT’L L., Part V—Article 13(1)(b), in [DRAFT] GUIDE TO GOOD PRACTICE 
UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 25 OCTOBER 1980 ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF 
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION (2019), https://perma.cc/TJ6N-QGZ7 [hereinafter HCCH, 
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Good Practice outlines three types of “grave risk.114 These types of risk are: a grave 
risk that the return would expose the child to physical harm, a grave risk that the 
return would expose the child to psychological harm, and a grave risk that the 
return would otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation. The Guide 
explains that these three types of risk must be (1) evaluated for the gravity of the 
risk and (2) assessed through a “forward-looking” lens.115 First, the level of risk 
must be “grave”—“the risk must be real and reach such a level of seriousness to 
be characterized as ‘grave.’”116 The Guide explains that the Convention drafters 
replaced “substantial risk” with “grave risk” because “‘grave’ was considered a 
more intensive qualifier.”117 Second, the exception should focus on the situation 
the child will face once returned.118 Although past experiences in their country of 
habitual residence may bear on this analysis, courts should be sure to factor in any 
changes that may have taken place since the child was last in the county that may 
affect his or her future experiences.119  
There is some evidence that the Guide has proven a useful resource for 
courts struggling with conflicting interpretations of Article 13(b). In 2011, the 
United Kingdom Supreme Court clarified the scope of the Article 13(b) defense 
in its seminal case Re E (Children). The decision echoed a number of the principles 
set forth in the Guide and added that “[t]here is no need for Art[icle] 13(b) to be 
narrowly construed. By its very terms it is of restricted application. The words of 
Art[icle] 13 are quite plain and need no further elaboration or gloss.”120 
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO THE IMMEDIATE RETURN OF THE CHILD 
If a court finds that the abductor has failed to establish a grave risk of harm 
defense, the child must be returned to his or her country of habitual residence. 
However, the judge is empowered to temporarily stay the return order. This 
option is useful in the context of infectious disease outbreaks—the court can 
reject the Article 13(b) exception but keep the child in the State of refuge until it 
is safe for him or her to travel. 121  
 
114  Id. at 15. 
115  Id. at 15–16. 
116  Id. at 15.  
117  Id. at 15 n.49. 
118  Id. at 16. 
119  Id.  
120 BK v. NK [2016] EWHC (Fam) 2496, [45] (explaining the holding in Re E (Children) (Abduction: 
Custody Appeal) [2011] 2 FLR 758), https://perma.cc/B9XL-FTSX. 
121  See, e.g., Gallegos v. Garcia Soto, No. 1:20-CV-92-RP, 2020 WL 2086554, at *8 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 
2020) (“However, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the effective date of this Order is stayed, 
indefinitely, until such time as the Court and the parties can be reasonably confident that the 
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If a court finds that the abductor has successfully established a grave risk of 
harm defense, the judge is faced with a decision. Article 13(b) provides that even 
if the court does find that the exception applies, the judge still has the ability to 
exercise his or her discretion to return the child notwithstanding the fact that the 
abductor has met his or her burden to show a grave risk of harm.122 A judge in the 
High Court of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Court of Appeal 
explained under what circumstances judges should exercise their discretion: 
It may be that highly unusual or exceptional circumstances might justify the 
exercise of the discretion to return the child notwithstanding the grave risk 
shown to exist although it is difficult to conceive of such situations. Even so, 
this could not and should not be done without the judge being fully satisfied 
that adequate and sufficient practical measures are in place to ensure that the 
child would not be exposed to any risk of harm.123 
In some States Party, courts are required to exercise their judicial discretion 
by considering protective measures that would, notwithstanding a grave risk of 
harm, allow the child to be returned to his or her habitual residence. Some U.S. 
courts are also required to consider such measures. The Second, Third, Sixth, 
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have all held that before denying return based on the 
grave risk of harm exception, courts should consider protective measures that 
would allow the child’s return while still providing for the child’s protection.124  
In most countries, protective measures take the form of voluntary 
undertakings, which are promises made by the left-behind parent to the court to 
do (or not do) certain things in conjuncture with the child’s return order. 
According to the Guide, 
[a]n undertaking is a voluntary promise, commitment or assurance given by a 
natural person – in general, the left-behind parent – to a court to do, or not 
to do, certain things. Courts in certain jurisdictions will accept, or even 
require, undertakings from the left-behind parent in relation to the return of 
a child. An undertaking formally given to a court in the requested jurisdiction 
in the context of return proceedings may or may not be enforceable in the 
State to which the child will be returned.125 
 
COVID-19 pandemic no longer renders international travel unsafe and widespread social 
distancing practices are no longer necessary . . . The Court will schedule status conferences as 
necessary to determine the precise date and the logistics of Y.E.G.'s return, involving the Mexican 
Consulate when appropriate and keeping in mind the need to ensure Y.E.G.'s return is both 
‘prompt’ and ‘safe.’”).  
122  The Hague Convention, supra note 14, art. 13.  
123  D. v. G. [2001] 1179 H.K.C. 1, 5 (C.F.A.)  (H.K.), https://perma.cc/QSH8-DPB2 (emphasis 
added).  
124  See generally Tracy Bateman Farrell, Annotation, Construction and Application of Grave Risk of Harm 
Exception in Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction as Implemented in 
International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11603(e)(2)(A), 56 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 163 (2011).  
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The Guide adds that such voluntary undertakings are not easily enforceable and 
therefore “should be used with caution, especially in cases [where the grave risk 
involves] domestic violence.”126 The court may also be able to give legal effect to 
a protective measure via a mirror order in the state of habitual residence if possible 
and available.127 However, the court “cannot make orders that would exceed its 
jurisdiction or that are not required to mitigate an established grave risk.”128 
If a “grave risk” is found—and if the judge declines to exercise his or her 
discretion to return the child notwithstanding the successfully mounted defense—
the consequences for the abducted child are fairly permanent: the left-behind 
parent’s petition will be denied, and the court will order the child to remain in the 
physical custody of the abductor. The left-behind parent can appeal the decision 
according the civil procedure rules of the court. After the left-behind parent 
exhausts the appeals process, however, the child’s custody status can only change 
if other forms of adjudication intercede—if, for example, a family court resolved 
the underlying custody dispute in a way that is averse to the abductor. The odds, 
however, of a favorable custody outcome for the left-behind parent in this 
situation are miserably low. The Pérez-Vera Report, explains why:  
It frequently happens that the person retaining the child tries to obtain a 
judicial or administrative decision in the State of refuge, which would legalize 
the factual situation which he has just brought about. However, if he is 
uncertain about the way in which the decision will go, he is just as likely to 
opt for inaction, leaving it up to the dispossessed party to take the initiative. 
Now, even if the latter acts quickly, that is to say manages to avoid the 
consolidation through lapse of time of the situation brought about by the 
removal of the child, the abductor will hold the advantage, since it is he who 
has chosen the forum in which the case is to be decided, a forum which, in 
principle, he regards as more favourable to his own claims. . . . In fact, 
resorting to this expedient, an individual can change the applicable law and 
obtain a judicial decision favourable to him. Admittedly, such a decision . . . 
will enjoy only a limited geographical validity, but in any event it bears a legal 
title sufficient to 'legalize' a factual situation which none of the legal systems 
involved wished to see brought about.129 
As discussed in Section II(A), the Hague Convention’s raison d'être is to 
ensure that the left-behind parent does not face the forum and logistical 
disadvantages inherent in being forced to litigate the underlying custody dispute 
in a foreign country chosen by the abductor. If the left-behind parent’s petition is 
denied because of a successful grave risk of harm defense, the left-behind parent, 
after exhausting the appeals process, is essentially left to fend for his or herself. 
When a left-behind parent emerges from the Hague Convention process empty-
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handed like this, it is more likely than not that the abductor will prevail in retaining 
the abducted child long-term. 
V. COVID-19’S IMPACT ON HAGUE CONVENTION CASES 
COVID-19 originated in China in 2019 but quickly spread around the globe, 
dramatically altering daily life everywhere.130 The virus is highly contagious and 
spreads from person to person among those in close contact through respiratory 
droplets.131 When an infected person coughs, sneezes, or talks, they release 
droplets which are in turn inhaled by people within about six feet, or two meters, 
of the contagious person.132 Common symptoms include fever, cough, and 
tiredness, and the severity of symptoms range from mild to severe.133 In the early 
days of the outbreak, several hotspots emerged, including Wuhan, China; Iran; 
northern Italy; Spain; and New York.134 As the global outbreak unfolded, the 
geographical concentrations of COVID shifted. Even a year after the outbreak, 
the number of new cases was growing faster than ever.135 By January 1, 2021, the 
virus had infected at least 84.2 million people, claiming 1.8 million lives 
worldwide.136 Eleven months after the outbreak started, more than 500,000 new 
cases of COVID-19 were reported globally per day.137 COVID-19 prompted 
worldwide school closures, workplace closures, and travel bans. This Section 
discusses how the global pandemic impacted Hague Convention litigation both 
logistically and substantively.  
A. Logistical Obstacles to the Administration of Proceedings  
It goes without saying that the administration of international child 
abduction cases—like the administration of all judicial proceedings, particularly 
those with an international dimension—was complicated by the COVID-19 
pandemic. When lockdowns began in March 2020, a member of the International 
Secretariat of the Association of Judges of Brazil began compiling information 
from colleagues in different countries to draft a global survey of measures taken 
 
130  Covid World Map: Tracking the Global Outbreak, N.Y. TIMES, https://perma.cc/8RQD-53RL.  
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BC7V.  
132  Id. 
133  Id.  
134   Covid World Map, supra note 130.  
135  Id. 
136  Id. 
137  Id. 
 Chicago Journal of International Law  
Vol. 22 No. 1 244 
to suspend judicial activity.138 The informal report showed that, over the course 
of just ten days in March, the suspension of judicial activity spread at an 
unprecedented rate across the globe. On March 22, 2020, the member wrote:  
The world faces an invisible army that carries death and disease wherever it 
goes. Scientists struggle against time in search of a vaccine against the virus 
or a cure for the disease. Governments adopt extreme contact restriction 
measures, with unpredictable economic consequences. . . . In this extreme 
scenario, the Judiciary in the world is forced to adapt. Presential activities are 
severely restricted in the most affected countries, but not only there. Remote 
work is widely adopted. Virtual audiences are encouraged.139  
And yet, despite the challenges presented by COVID-19, the wheels of justice 
continued turning—“[t]he Judiciary adapts, but does not stop.”140 
B. Guidance from the HCCH 
The year that the Hague Convention was signed, 1980, was a triumphant 
year for global health: it was the year that the World Health Organization (WHO) 
formally declared the global eradication of smallpox.141 Smallpox had plagued 
humans for millennia and killed one third of infected patients.142 The WHO’s 
formal declaration followed a nearly two-decade-long global vaccination 
campaign, which was seen as a culmination of advances in the science of 
vaccinations. “Polio vaccines, which were introduced in the 1950s and 1960s lead 
to similar success globally.”143 In the decades leading up to the signing of the 
Hague Convention, several epidemics impacted the global community. The Asian 
Flu pandemic killed more than one million people worldwide between 1957 and 
1958.144 In 1961, “a cholera pandemic originating in Indonesia spread[ ] to other 
parts of Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.”145 In 1968, the Hong Kong Flu 
pandemic killed an estimated one million people, about half of them residents of 
Hong Kong.146 The Hague Convention was signed a year before the Centers for 
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Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) first reported “a rare form of pneumonia 
later identified as Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, or AIDS.”147   
Although the signing of the Hague Convention coincided with a 
revolutionary achievement in the realm of global health—and although it can 
safely be assumed that most, if not all, of the drafters were savvy to the existence 
of recent outbreaks of smallpox, cholera, and Hong Kong Flu—there is no 
evidence that the drafters discussed the potential impact of infectious disease 
outbreaks on international child abduction cases. 148 The Hague Convention was 
intended to address a very specific type of cross-border, peacetime cooperation; 
it was not designed with a global health crisis or accompanying lockdowns and 
judicial suspensions in mind. 
In July 2020, the HCCH released an emergency toolkit to help guide courts 
amidst the pandemic.149 The toolkit advises that cases should be considered on an 
ad hoc basis and assures courts that “[t]he Convention continues to be effectively 
applied in times of COVID-19 through contact and cooperation with, and the 
sharing of resources between, Central Authorities.”150 The toolkit encourages 
courts to “[f]ocus on the child” by “[s]ecuring the safe and prompt return of the 
child to the State of habitual residence” and “[e]nsuring continuing and suitable 
contact between [the left-behind] parent and child.”151 The Permanent Bureau 
urges States Party to employ mediation, embrace technology, safeguard equality 
in access to the courts, and communicate “among members of the judiciary across 
borders through direct judicial communications or the International Hague 
Network of Judges.”152 The toolkit acknowledges that “[t]he current restrictions 
on international travel pose challenges to the enforcement of return orders under 
the Convention.”153  
In courts around the world, judges responded to the new practical obstacles 
facing Hague Convention proceedings. These proceedings are voluminous; in 
2015, at least 2,997 children were involved in 2,270 return of child petitions.154 
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Many judges held their Hague Convention proceedings remotely.155 In Hague 
Convention cases where the left-behind parent prevailed, courts have been faced 
with the realities of enforcing return orders in the middle of a global pandemic. 
Citing the Convention’s requirement that the return of the child be “prompt,”156 
many courts have chosen to enforce return orders without delay, despite the risks 
of travel.157 Other courts have temporarily stayed the return of the child,158 citing 
travel bans, the risks associated with travel during the pandemic, and the 
Convention’s requirement that children’s returns be “safe.”159  
C. Article 13(b) Issues 
As more Hague Convention cases grapple with infectious disease as the basis 
for Article 13(b) defenses, three major questions will likely emerge. First, does 
international travel generally—and air travel specifically—pose a “grave risk of 
harm” during an infectious disease outbreak? Since the start of the pandemic, the 
vast majority of governments have issued stay-at-home requirements or 
household lockdowns.160 In January 2021, the majority of governments had either 
1) an active stay-at-home order, recommending citizens refrain from leaving their 
homes or 2) an active stay-at-home order with exceptions for daily exercise, 
grocery shopping, and other essential errands.161 Additionally, many countries had 
active travel bans.162 Both of these types of government responses were designed 
 
ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 3 (2018), https://perma.cc/HA27-
L9DV. 
155  See, e.g., KR v. HH, [2020] EWHC (Fam) 834 (Eng.). 
156  The Hague Convention, supra note 14, art. 1. 
157  See, e.g., Chambers v. Russell, No. 1:20CV498, 2020 WL 5044036, at *15 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 26, 2020) 
(“[T]he minor child, Z.R., shall be returned forthwith to the Country of Jamaica. Respondent shall 
arrange for Z.R. to be returned to Jamaica on or before September 4, 2020.”); Thüringer 
Oberlandesgericht [OLGZ] [Higher Regional Court of Thuringia] Mar. 17, 2020, 1 UF 11/20 (Ger.) 
(“In its letter dated March 16, 2020, the Youth Welfare Office applied to have enforcement of the 
return order issued by Jena Local Court–Family Court–deferred for a limited period due to the 
current coronavirus pandemic. . . . The application made by the Youth Welfare Office is to be 
rejected.”). 
158  See, e.g., Gallegos v. Garcia Soto, No. 1:20-CV-92-RP, 2020 WL 2086554, at *8 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 
2020) (“However, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the effective date of this Order is stayed, 
indefinitely, until such time as the Court and the parties can be reasonably confident that the 
COVID-19 pandemic no longer renders international travel unsafe and widespread social distancing 
practices are no longer necessary . . . The Court will schedule status conferences as necessary to 
determine the precise date and the logistics of Y.E.G.'s return, involving the Mexican Consulate 
when appropriate and keeping in mind the need to ensure Y.E.G.'s return is both “prompt” and 
“safe.”).  
159  The Hague Convention, supra note 14, art. 7. 
160  Policy Responses to the Coronavirus Pandemic, OUR WORLD IN DATA, https://perma.cc/NQ8R-EDX9.  
161  Id.  
162  Id.  
Cured: The Zone of Disease Defense Mora 
Summer 2021 247 
to slow the spread of the virus. Most governments strongly discouraged 
international travel and air travel. In the case outlined in the Introduction, KR v. 
HH, the judge acknowledged that “international travel at this time potentially 
carries with it a higher prospect of infection than remaining in self-isolation.”163 
Second, can one country’s infectious disease outbreak pose a “grave risk of 
harm” relative to another country’s outbreak? This line of inquiry acknowledges 
the ubiquity of the pandemic but also pits the infection rates of the child’s habitual 
residence against those in the State of refuge. It may also compare the prudence 
and efficacy of different government responses and public health policies or assert 
predictions about how a certain government’s responses and policies will impact 
future infection rates in that country. Judges typically appear reluctant to engage 
in this type of comparative analysis. The judge in KR v. HH refused to make a 
finding as to relative risk between England and Spain and simply concluded that 
there was “a genuine risk that PT could contract the virus whether she remains in 
England or returns to Spain.”164 
Third, does a child—or do children in general—face a grave risk of illness 
after being infected by the infectious disease? Instead of evaluating the risk of 
exposure that a child’s return will entail and the likelihood that a child will contract 
the virus, this line of inquiry assesses the relative risk of the symptoms the child 
would experience should he or she contract the virus. Although many people only 
experience mild symptoms once they become infected with COVID, others face 
serious illness and complications like pneumonia, organ failure, blot clots, and/or 
death.165 Data shows that older adults have a higher risk of serious illness and 
complications from COVID-19;166 when compared to this vulnerable age group, 
children may not face a grave risk of illness. Similarly, if a child has an existing 
chronic medical condition known to put people at greater risk of becoming 
seriously ill with COVID-19, such as sickle cell disease, severe obesity, or serious 
heart disease, he or she may face a grave risk of illness.167 In KR v. HH, the judge 
made a point of noting that neither PT nor her parents were elderly or had 
preexisting health concerns.168 Ultimately, the judge incorporated this fact into his 
ultimate finding by reasoning that although “the travel associated with a return is 
likely to increase the risk that PT could contract coronavirus . . . I do not consider 
such a risk, when considered in the context of the likely harm that would be suffered by PT 
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should she contract the virus, is sufficient to amount to the ‘grave risk’ of physical harm 
required by Art[icle] 13(b).”169 
Recently, a number of these issues were raised in The Father v. The Mother,170 
a Hague Convention case in a family court in Tel Aviv. In that case, the mother 
(abductor) opposed her daughter’s return to the U.S. from Israel, arguing that 
“[t]here is a real health danger to the Minor, and each day worsens and increases 
the risk of damage should she fly. According to the experts, the epidemic in the 
United States is not under control at this point.”171 The mother pointed to news 
articles to bolster her position, including one entitled “More than China: The 
United States is first in the number of corona patients.”172 When asked to respond, 
the father wrote, “[t]he corona situation as you know is a problematic situation 
worldwide,” adding that “the situation in Israel is worse than the situation in 
California.”173 Additionally, he argued that his daughter had health insurance in 
the U.S. but not in Israel—“If, God forbid, something happens to her, then 
[California] is the place where she should be.”174 The father noted that “children 
are hardly at risk, the risk is marginal or non-existent.”175  
The court concluded that the child would be safer in the U.S. “in light of the 
insurance coverage there” and held that because COVID-19 was not related to 
the child’s health condition, the mother had not demonstrated that the child would 
face a grave risk of harm.176 In its opinion, the court highlighted the mother’s 
COVID-19 Article 13(b) defense, writing:  
There is extreme importance that precisely in times of great uncertainty it is 
heard loud and clear that Minors’ rights are not an anarchy and the emergency 
situation cannot be exploited for change status de-facto [sic] disregarding the 
Minor’s right, her Father’s rights and ignore [sic] the provisions under 
International Conventions designed for ensuring minors’ rights and intended 
to settle complex legal and urgent situations between countries. 177  
The court also rejected the mother’s requests to delay the ruling in the case and 
prohibit the return of the child until the travel restrictions put in place by Israel’s 
Ministry of Health and the WHO had been lifted.178 
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VI. ANALOGIZING INFECTIOUS DISEASE TO EXISTING PRECEDENT 
Surprisingly, legal scholars have never evaluated the propriety of an Article 
13(b) defense predicated on the risks of an infectious disease, even though 
“disease” is one of the three zones enumerated by the Friedrich framework. Despite 
outbreaks of Ebola, cholera, SARS, and Zika over the last decade,179 COVID-19-
era litigation is the first to bring to light the potential applicability of the Article 
13(b) exception to instances of infectious disease outbreaks. First, this Section will 
establish the dearth of “zone of disease” caselaw. Next, it will turn to the most 
robust category of “zone of” caselaw—“zone of war” cases—and reflect again on 
the narrow parameters of Article 13(b) and courts’ preferences for showings of 
particularized risk. Throughout this Section, the COVID-19 fact patterns serve as 
a touchstone to discuss the broader issue of Article 13(b) exceptions predicated 
on the risks of infectious diseases.  
A. The Illusive “Zone of Disease” 
The “zone of disease” construction of the Article 13(b) defense is rarely 
raised by abductors and, when it is, it is typically raised halfheartedly and as part 
of a broader argument about conditions in the child’s habitual residence. In 
Tavarez v. Jarrett,180 for example, the abductor argued that Mexico posed a grave 
risk of harm to the child “due to inadequate medical care, risk of disease, high 
rates of criminal activity, and abuse.”181 The court found that there was no 
evidence offered to support the “zone of disease” defense other than the 
testimony of the abductor’s counsel that “there is no mosquito control [in 
Mexico].”182 
 Sometimes, courts characterize the defenses, that couch these weak “zone 
of disease” arguments, as poverty defenses. Typically, courts are unsympathetic to 
poverty defenses in the Hague Convention context, sensing the possibility of their 
abuse by abductors who are more affluent than their taking parent counterparts. 
For example, in Cuellar v. Joyce, the Ninth Circuit assessed a grave risk of harm 
defense brought by the father, claiming that the mother’s home in Panama lacked 
running water, air conditioning, or refrigeration and that the child was not given 
a proper diet, had reoccurring ear infections, and had unexplained burns behind 
her ears.183 The father also asserted that the child had suffered a head trauma in 
an accident that could have been prevented had the mother been attentive.184 The 
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court noted that “[b]illions of people live in circumstances similar to those 
described . . . . If that amounted to a grave risk of harm, parents in more 
developed countries would have unchecked power to abduct children from 
countries with a lower standard of living.”185 The Ninth Circuit held that the claims 
made by the father did not amount to a “grave risk of harm” and ordered the 
return of the child to Panama.186 
Unlike the concerns raised by the father in Cuellar, the risks associated with 
the global pandemic have much less to do with the wealth of a country or the 
financial stability of the left-behind parent. While there is evidence that poverty 
may heighten the risk of infection and complications from COVID-19, the 
pandemic clearly affects populations across socioeconomic lines.187 Thus, a court 
could not dismiss a COVID-19 “zone of disease” defense on the grounds that it 
constituted a poverty defense. However, it is possible that a future infectious 
disease outbreak could have a socioeconomic dimension that is not borne out by 
COVID-19. The Ninth Circuit’s statement that “[b]illions of people live in similar 
circumstances to those described” does apply to the current situation. Thus, the 
fact that the pandemic is ubiquitous may undermine its utility as the basis for an 
Article 13(b) defense. On the other hand, if a future infectious disease outbreak 
were less ubiquitous and more localized, this aspect of the inquiry might cut the 
other way.  
In C v. G188 the Republic of Ireland’s Court of Appeal tackled the “zone of 
disease” defense head on. The Court of Appeal overturned a High Court decision 
to refuse the return of a seven-year-old boy to Poland on the grounds that 
international travel during COVID-19 posed a grave risk to his physical safety.189 
The Court of Appeal held that the risks posed by COVID-19 were insufficient to 
establish an Article 13(b) defense alone.190 The court noted that Friedrich’s “zone 
of disease” formulation would be rendered moot by this application, since every 
country in the world had been affected by the pandemic.191 Allowing a “zone of 
disease” defense in this case would, “essentially, involve the suspension of the 
operation of the Convention.”192 The court went on to note that the “zone of 
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disease” formulation should be understood in the context of its inclusion with 
“war” and “famine”—suggesting that the “zone of disease” formulation should 
be limited as well.193 The application of the “zone of disease” defense in C v. G 
aligns with the trend in Friedrich caselaw towards narrow construction and with 
the general thrust of Cuellar. 
The HCCH’s Guide to Good Practice acknowledges that health risks could 
constitute an Article 13(b) exception. First, the Guide advises that “[i]n cases 
involving assertions associated with the child’s health, the grave risk analysis 
should focus on the availability of treatment in the State of habitual residence, and 
not on a comparison between the relative quality of care in each State.”194 In 
analogizing to the infectious disease outbreak fact pattern, this guidance suggests 
that, provided there are adequate government public health precautions and 
medical facilities available in the child’s country of habitual residence, courts 
should resist comparing the healthcare systems of the two countries. The Guide’s 
resistance to comparison may also suggest, more broadly, that courts should avoid 
comparing the relative risk of infection in the two countries. Second, the Guide 
advises that “[a] grave risk will typically be established only in situations where a 
treatment is or would be needed urgently and it is not available or accessible in 
the State of habitual residence, or where the child’s health does not allow for travel 
back to this State at all.”195  
In State Central Authority v. Maynard, the Family Court of Australia held that 
return to England would expose a child to an Article 13(b) grave risk where 
extensive medical records demonstrated that the child’s epileptic seizures meant 
that “travel could result in significant and serious damage to [the child] or her 
death.”196 On the other hand, the court rejected the abductor’s arguments 
comparing the English medical system to the Australian medical system.197  
Here, there is a clear parallel to the risk of international travel presented by 
an infectious disease outbreak and the arguments echo those raised by the 
abductor in The Father v. The Mother. However, in State Central Authority, the child 
had a specific, demonstrable, pre-existing medical condition that created a 
particularized serious health risk incident to travel. This distinction suggests that 
while the Guide and cases like State Central Authority may encourage courts to 
consider the risks of travel in terms of how an infectious disease may interact with 
a child’s pre-existing medical condition, these authorities would not necessarily 
extend that consideration to every child during an infectious disease outbreak. It 
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is likely that the generalized health risks associated with international travel during 
COVID-19 do not fall within the purview of this guidance.  
B. Zone of War  
Although, the zone of war caselaw is more fleshed out than other aspects of 
the Friedrich framework, the existing precedent mostly serves to confirm and 
reinforce the limitations of the Article 13(b) “zone of” exceptions. Commensurate 
with other areas of Friedrich caselaw, the zone of war formulation is construed 
“extremely narrow[ly]” by courts and rarely, if ever, succeeds.198 In Silverman v. 
Silverman, for example, the Eighth Circuit held that Israel did not constitute a zone 
of war, despite intense regional violence, including suicide bombings.199 As 
previously mentioned in Section III, the U.S. is not alone—courts in Argentina, 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the U.K., France, and Germany have all 
found that the conditions in Israel did not constitute a grave risk of harm within 
the meaning of Article 13(b).200 In reaching its decision the Eighth Circuit 
reasoned that the situation “threaten[ed] everyone in Israel,” bolstering the idea 
that a generalized risk may be insufficient to show a grave risk.201 This reasoning 
is awkward because, almost by definition, a zone of war creates a dangerous 
situation for the general public. If general regional violence that “threaten[s] 
everyone” is insufficient to demonstrate a grave risk of harm under Friedrich, is the 
zone of war framework obsolete? Likely, under Silverman’s logic, the risk of an 
infectious disease outbreak does not rise to the level of grave risk imagined by 
Article 13(b). Indisputably, the pandemic “threaten[s] everyone.” This 
generalization is even more true in the COVID-19 context because the threat of 
the pandemic cannot be conceptually severed from its global nature—whereas the 
violence in Silverman only extended to the broader Middle East/North Africa 
region. And, crucially, the risks are equally extreme: death is the worst-case 
scenario of living in a war zone or being infected by a disease.  
The Silverman opinion points to a district court case with more concrete zone 
of war criteria.202 Freier v. Freier evaluates another a grave risk of harm defense 
predicated on the 1996 violence in Israel, finding it similarly insufficient to the 
defense raised in Silverman.203 But unlike the Eighth Circuit in Silverman, in reaching 
its decision in Freier, the district court provided specific reasoning. The court held 
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that Israel did not qualify as a zone of war because schools and businesses were 
open and the petitioner was able to leave the country.204 Additionally, the court 
noted that “the fighting is limited to certain areas and does not directly involve 
the city where the child resides.”205  
Analogizing from this logic, COVID-19 would most likely have constituted 
a grave risk of harm in some countries at certain points during the course of the 
pandemic. First, school closures were widespread due to the pandemic. According 
to UNESCO, on April 2, 2020, 84.5% of total learners enrolled at pre-primary, 
primary, lower-secondary, upper-secondary, and tertiary education levels were 
impacted by COVID-19 school closures worldwide.206 Almost 1.5 billion learners 
were affected, and 172 countries had implemented nationwide school closures.207 
By September 2020, those numbers had fallen, but 49.6% of total learns were still 
impacted by closures worldwide.208 More than 850 million children were still 
affected, and there were 50 country-wide school closures still in effect.209  
Second, many countries had workplace closures as a result of the pandemic. 
In some countries, including China, Brazil, Chile, and Indonesia, workplace 
closures were still in effect in September 2020 for all but essential workplaces such 
as grocery stores and medical facilities.210 By contrast, in countries like Canada, 
Mexico, India, and Russia workplace closures were only in effect for select sectors 
or categories of workers as of fall 2020.211 Globally, workplace closures shifted 
with the tides of infection rates and public policy calculations as the markets 
reacted to the cost of forced closures and laborers reevaluated health risks against 
growing financial pressure to return to work.  
Third, many countries put in place travel bans to stem the flow of the 
pandemic. For example, in April 2020, more than 7.1 billion people worldwide 
lived in countries with travel bans.212 “Roughly 3 billion people . . . live[ed] in 
countries with borders completely closed to noncitizens and nonresidents.”213 On 
March 28, China closed its borders to foreigners with the exception of “some 
diplomatic and scientific personnel.”214 At the start of the pandemic India “closed 
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its borders by suspending visas and requiring a two-week quarantine for all arrivals 
regardless of citizenship.”215 Since the beginning of the outbreak, governments 
slowly lifted or amended travel bans, but many countries continued to enforce 
travel restrictions in some form or another, especially for noncitizens.216 In 
September 2020, 70 countries were completely closed and 55 countries had no 
travel restrictions.217  
Thus, according to the three metrics posited by Freier, COVID-19 may have 
presented a grave risk of harm to some children in certain countries at certain 
times during the pandemic. However, the analysis above highlights the fickle 
nature of Freier’s standards in this context, as the impacts of infectious diseases 
are constantly in flux. The Freier framework may be administrable in the context 
of a protracted war, but in terms of an infectious disease outbreak, where the 
landscape of risk and government responses change daily, these metrics would 
likely prove unmanageable. Additionally, Freier’s reasoning has a very limited 
sphere of influence. Not only does it lack appellate authority, the opinion also 
employs this criterion to reach an unfavorable decision for the abductor on the 
Article 13(b) defense. The likelihood that Freier could be used to successfully argue 
an Article 13(b) defense predicated on the risks posed by the pandemic or another 
infectious disease outbreak is slim. This likelihood is weakened by a stark fact 
raised in Silverman: “there does not appear to be [any] case that finds any country 
a ‘zone of war’ under the Convention.”218 
VII. SUGGESTIONS 
This Comment recommends that, generally, courts should reject Article 
13(b) defenses predicated on infectious disease outbreaks like COVID-19. 
Instead, courts should adopt a rebuttable presumption that the risk of exposure 
to an infectious disease does not constitute a grave risk of harm to the child within 
the meaning of the Hague Convention. If States Party decline to adopt such a 
rebuttable presumption, they should, at the very least, provide left-behind parents 
with an equitable relief doctrine in cases where the abductor has already put the 
child at risk of infection.  
A. The Rebuttable Presumption  
This Comment advocates for a rebuttable presumption against “zone of 
disease” defenses. Under this rule, the abductor would be able to rebut the 
presumption against the “zone of disease” defense by demonstrating that the child 
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faces a particularized risk of serious complications incident to infection. As 
demonstrated in Sections III and VI, States Party have generally understood the 
Article 13(b) exception to be applicable in situations of particularized, rather than 
generalized, risk. A particularized risk of serious complications would require a 
showing that the child is more at risk of serious complications like serious injury 
or death than the general population. Evidence such as the extensive medical 
records presented by the abductor in State Central Authority219 demonstrating her 
child’s epileptic seizure condition, would be persuasive. Courts should weigh 
heavily medical records and reports from credible health institutions (such as the 
WHO or the CDC) showing that the child is part of a particularly vulnerable 
population. Testimony from the child’s medical provider would also be cogent. In 
rare cases, a showing of generalized risk may be sufficient if the abductor could 
show that the child still faced a substantial risk of serious injury or death even 
absent a particular vulnerability. For example, such an exception would have 
applied to a disease like smallpox, which had a mortality rate of over thirty 
percent.220 
In situations where a particularized risk is found, the court should hold that 
the child faces a “grave risk of harm” within the meaning of the Hague 
Convention. However, if there are reasonable voluntary undertakings the court 
could impose to neutralize the particularized risk, the court should exercise its 
discretion to return the child despite the finding that the abductor had met his or 
her burden under the Article 13(b) exception. Courts should elicit voluntary 
undertakings from left-behind parents to place customized safety precautions on 
return orders. These voluntary undertakings could include promises to help the 
child practice social distancing, mask-wearing, and quarantine and promises to 
comply with certain travel recommendations, including recommendations 
regarding the timing of travel plans and modes of transportation. Similarly, the 
court should consider issuing a return order, but staying the order until the 
particularized threat to the child is neutralized. 
In cases where no particularized risk to the child is found and the taking 
parent has failed to meet his or her Article 13(b) burden, the judge must return 
the child to his or her habitual residence. However, even absent a showing of 
particularized harm, the court should take precautions to protect the safety of the 
child. If the infectious disease poses a serious public health risk, the court should 
adopt reasonable protective measures and consider temporarily staying the order 
for the child’s return.   
A rebuttable presumption against the “zone of disease” defense is an 
appropriate solution to the risks posed by infectious diseases for several reasons. 
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First, as discussed in Section IV, while an infectious disease outbreak is, by 
definition, a temporary occurrence, the consequences of a court finding a grave 
risk to the child can effectively finalize the child’s custody arrangement by making 
it nearly impossible for a left-behind parent to retrieve their child if they are 
unsuccessful in appealing the trail court’s judgment. If the court finds a grave risk 
of harm to the child, the judge must deny the Hague petition and refuse the return 
of the child unless the judge decides to exercise his or her discretion to grant the 
return the child notwithstanding the established grave risk. While this judicial 
discretion exists in theory, some judges feel that such measures are only justified 
in “highly unusual or exceptional circumstances” and remark that “it is difficult to 
conceive of such situations.” 221 Instead of relying on judges to exercise their 
discretion when erroneous “zone of disease” defenses are successfully raised, 
States Party should build the preferred outcome into their reading of the law itself 
by creating a rebuttable presumption against such defenses.  
Moreover, the Convention drafters intended that the exceptions to return to 
be narrowly drawn, and thus a rebuttable presumption effectuates the original 
understanding of the grave risk of harm defense. As discussed in Sections II(A) 
and IV, the purpose of the Convention is to neutralize the artificial legal and 
logistical advantages enjoyed by the taking parent as a result of international child 
abduction. The drafters feared that “a systemic invocation of the [Convention’s] 
exceptions, substituting the forum chosen by the abductors for that of the child’s 
[habitual] residence, would lead to the collapse of the whole structure of the 
Convention by depriving it of the spirit of mutual confidence which is its 
inspiration.”222 A rebuttable presumption bolsters a narrow construction of this 
defense, avoiding a “systemic invocation” of the Article 13(b) exception, while 
providing for the safety of the child via protective measures and stays.  
Finally, a rebuttable presumption against “zone of disease” defenses upholds 
the foundational principle of the Convention. “[T]he Convention as a whole,” 
wrote Pérez-Vera, “rests upon the unanimous rejection of this phenomenon of 
illegal child removals and upon the conviction that the best way to combat them 
at an international level is to refuse to grant them legal recognition.”223 A 
rebuttable presumption ensures that all children who can be safely returned to 
their habitual residence are returned as soon as possible. A child victim of 
international child abduction “suffers from the sudden upsetting of his stability, 
the traumatic loss of contact with the parent who has been in charge of his 
upbringing, the uncertainty and frustration which come with the necessity to adapt 
to a strange language, unfamiliar cultural conditions and unknown teaches and 
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relatives.”224 In addition to these uncomfortable and frightening experiences of 
destabilization, children may face long-term mental health struggles as a result of 
their abduction. Studies have shown that “[c]hildren who have been 
psychologically violated and maltreated through the act of abduction, are more 
likely to exhibit a variety of psychological and social handicaps.”225 Abducted 
children suffer from depression, excessive fearfulness, helplessness, anger, 
disruption in identity formation, and fear of abandonment—conditions which 
may persist lifelong.226 Overall, a rebuttable presumption against “zone of disease” 
defenses increases the likelihood that a child will be returned to his or her habitual 
residence and lessens the length of time a child spends away from home as a victim 
of international child abduction. 
B. The Unclean Hands Doctrine  
Lastly, if States Party decline to adopt such a rebuttable presumption, they 
should, at the very least, provide left-behind parents with an equitable relief 
doctrine in cases where the abductor has already put the child at risk of infection. 
If an abductor has abducted a child during an infectious disease outbreak and is 
now insisting that the child cannot be returned because of that outbreak, the 
abductor has “unclean hands.”  
Traditionally, the doctrine of unclean hands is understood for the equitable 
maxim that “he who comes into equity must come with clean hands.”227 It is a 
“self-imposed ordinance that closes the doors of a court of equity to one tainted 
with inequitableness or bad faith relative to the mater in which he seeks relief, 
however improper may have been the behavior of the defendant.”228 Historically, 
U.S. courts have declined to apply the doctrine in Hague Convention cases. In 
Karpenko v. Leendertz, for example, the Third Circuit held that the mother’s 
interference with the father’s custody rights did not bar return after the father’s 
wrongful removal of the child and concluded that the “application of the unclean 
hands doctrine would undermine the Hague Convention’s goal of protecting the 
well-being of the child.”229 However, this rejection of the unclean hands doctrine 
should be reconsidered in light of the peculiar fact dynamics at play in a “zone of 
disease” defense.  
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In the context of the “zone of disease” defense, the unclean hands doctrine 
would preclude the use of the Article 13(b) exception by abductors who had 
already exposed their children to the infectious disease at issue. A family court in 
London recently heard a case in which such a doctrine could be applied. In Re N 
(a child),230 the mother took her child to the Greek island of Paros on March 20, 
2020, three days before the Prime Minister announced a national lockdown in the 
U.K.231 The mother claimed that her intention in traveling to Paros was to escape 
the dangers of the pandemic:  
[T]he main reason that I have come to Greece is that I am very afraid of the 
coronavirus and I want to do whatever I can to keep N (and me) safe from 
it. The small Greek island where my mother lives, where N and I are now 
staying with her, is naturally isolated from the mainland and has its own 
medical facilities. It is absolutely safe for until now there were zero (0) 
incidents of corona virus contamination. I believe that it is a much safer place 
to be for us than the much more densely populated area of Barking / outskirts 
of London.232  
The court held that while the mother may be correct that the COVID-19 infection 
rate was lower in Greece at the time, “that does not justify, in the slightest, what 
was a wrongful removal of N from the place of his habitual residence.”233 
Ultimately the court did not reach the merits of the petition,234 but the facts of Re 
N (a child) nevertheless raise a thought-provoking hypothetical: what if the 
abductor in Re N (a child) had levied a “zone of disease” defense to the child’s 
return to Barking? 
Common sense dictates that an abductor who traveled with her child during 
the pandemic—albeit early in the outbreak (March 20)—should be precluded 
from arguing that her child would face a “grave risk of harm” were the child 
ordered to return to the U.K. Essentially, the abductor has already exposed the 
child to the same “grave risk.” Recently, a U.S. district court agreed, quickly 
disposing of the abductor’s Article 13(b) defense. Without specifically naming the 
unclean hands doctrine, the judge reasoned with similar logic: 
Finally, Respondent argues that the risk from COVID-19 is so great that he 
should not be required to return Z.R. to Jamaica. The court does not find this 
testimony persuasive. Respondent testified that he recently brought his six-
year-old daughter from Jamaica to stay with him in the U.S.; he will be taking 
her back later this month.235 
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An equitable relief doctrine akin to the unclean hands doctrine would provide left-
behind parents a necessary safety net in jurisdictions that decline to adopt a 
rebuttable presumption against “zone of disease” defenses. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed troubling gaps in Article 13(b) 
caselaw and guidelines. During the global health crisis, abductors have carved out 
a new iteration of the grave risk of harm defense predicated on the risks posed by 
an infectious disease outbreak. It is essential that States Party put forward a united 
response to this “zone of disease” defense. A rebuttable presumption against the 
“zone of disease” defense would correctly balance the Hague Convention’s goal 
of restoring the legal status quo between parties while preserving the important 
“safety valve” function Article 13(b) is meant to provide. Doubtless, these cases 
present courts with an unenviable task. Future scholarship may speculate on the 
ethical pitfalls of entrusting judges with risk assessments that necessarily draw on 
an emerging and ever-evolving body of public health news and medical research. 
In the meantime, courts should continue to combat the scourge of international 
child abduction by securing the prompt and safe return of abducted children, 
reminding abductors “that Minors’ rights are not an anarchy and the emergency 
situation cannot be exploited.”236 
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